|Page Name:||Reference: Livestock Management|
The way people were handled and manipulated by Nazis and the Stalin regime have many similarities with the treatment of livestock. The similarities are not only between slaughterhouses and the extermination camps, but also the way the victims were manipulated before reaching the kill zone. One of the ideas presented by the George_Pólya at his 1945 book, "How to Solve it", is that one of the thing to try, when looking for a solution to an unsolved problem, is to look for problems that are similar to the unsolved problem, look for an analogies, and then try to fit the solutions of the analogous solved problems to fit the problem that is to be solved. Mass murders, extermination camps, are very similar to slaughterhouses.
The Problem to Solve
Defining the problem is a difficult task in its own right. The most simplest approximation might be: how to escape an extermination camp. A slightly more nuanced problem to solve might be: how to avoid that part of the prison, from where there is no escape. An even more nuanced problem to solve might be: how to be useless for the exterminators and avoid being "collateral damage" for exterminators, who do not care to be economically rational. May be the problem to solve is: how to exterminate the extermination camp owners, without having any collateral damage. May be in stead of a single problem there is a group of problems, like, how to avoid being captured and how to destroy extermination camps. May be in stead of a single group of independent problems, there are multiple sets of problems that depend on each other within their respective sets of problems.
The thing to keep in mind, when defining a problem, is that objective functions depend on the culture of the person, who defines the objective function. If the objective function is defined, then the questions for looking for a way, how to drive the output of the objective function, also depend on the culture of the person, who asks the questions. Supposedly that's the reason, why the American CIA failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. (May be the CIA "failed" to predict it, because they were afraid to loose their jobs that were mainly about spying after the Soviet Union. Their counterpart, the KGB, had the problem that agents reported crap data just to look more useful and tell their bosses more, what the bosses wanted to hear.)
One possible approach is to look for analogies from games like chess. In chess it does not matter, what the other player thinks, desires. The only thing that matters is, WHAT IS TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE for an adversary to do and the subjective, culture based, part is, how to calculate the damages that the adversary can induce and what kind of prioritization algorithm one uses to minimize the damages. The prioritization algorithm of the defending side can use data about the technical capabilities of the defending side.
Data for Analysis