Artifact ID: | c1abe9e0c03ce6311df184942394e25ec323d279 |
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Page Name: | Experiment: mmmv_symsig_t1 |

Date: | 2017-10-08 20:43:06 |

Original User: | martin_vahi |

Parent: | 0b991420453c23a8d66fa3b17d471918a4c1a351 (diff) |

Next | 7e75ebb57c89cd4708dbbc55869c816095bc1880 |

The mmmv_symsig_t1 **wraps symmetric key encryption command line tools**
and **implements a signing system**, where parties, who have never met
directly for a key exchange can **probabilistically authenticate** each
other. The feasibility of using
one-time-pads
or
one-time-pad
like ciphers is based on the fact that a year 2017 price for 1GiB of
USB-stick based flash memory costs about 1€. With the exception of **metadata
related security issues**, one-time-pad like ciphers tend to eliminate
security flaws at the encryption algorithm side.

*It's worth to note that if both keys of a public encryption algorithm are
bundled together and the whole pair is kept secret the way symmetric keys
are kept secret, then public key encryption algorithms can be used as symmetric
key encryption algorithms. That allows the "standard" tools like the
GNU Privacy Guard to be used in the role of
the symmetric key encryption algorithm implementation.*

# Overview

**EnU**), including the Bob and the Alice, individually meet with a key exchange service provider (hereafter:

**KXS**). The KXS gives each EnU multiple GiB worth of symmetric keys that are shared only between the KXS and the EnU. If the EnUs have not met with each other for a key exchange, then the KXS forms a central hub that decrypts the ciphertext of one EnU and encrypts it for another EnU.