Update of "Experiment: mmmv_symsig_t1"
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Overview

Artifact ID: ad64b1e2546971b2c0297117fbc99ed2c102c8dd
Page Name:Experiment: mmmv_symsig_t1
Date: 2017-10-09 23:53:12
Original User: martin_vahi
Parent: 0378d4292fcce184b9932b7d0cc8af046abba56f (diff)
Next b10ebdb24a8b85bb09362c99ce8b04cdd8a04554
Content

Currently the mmmv_symsig_t1 lacks any code.

The mmmv_symsig_t1 wraps symmetric key encryption command line tools and implements a signing system, where parties, who have never met directly for a key exchange can probabilistically authenticate each other. The feasibility of using one-time-pads or one-time-pad like ciphers is based on the fact that a year 2017 price for 1GiB of USB-stick based flash memory costs about 1€. With the exception of metadata related security issues, one-time-pad like ciphers tend to eliminate security flaws at the encryption algorithm side.

It's worth to note that if both keys of a public encryption algorithm are bundled together and the whole pair is kept secret the way  symmetric keys are kept secret, then public key encryption algorithms can be used as symmetric key encryption algorithms. That allows the "standard" tools like the GNU Privacy Guard to be used in the role of the symmetric key encryption algorithm implementation.


The Scheme

End users(hereafter: EnU), including the Bob and the Alice, individually meet with a key exchange service provider (hereafter: KXS). The KXS gives each EnU multiple GiB worth of symmetric keys that are shared only between the KXS and the EnU. If the EnUs have not met with each other for a key exchange, then the KXS forms a central hub that decrypts the ciphertext of one EnU and encrypts the cleartext for another EnU. That is to say, if the Bob and the Alice use only a single KXS, then the KXS acts like the Eve, when the Eve conducts a man-in-the-middle attack. To probabilistically counter the man-in-the-middle attack, the Bob and the Alice use the services of multiple KXS to agree a set of temporary encryption keys, one temporary key per one KXS. The Bob and the Alice use the temporary keys for onion-encrypting the actual data exchange between themselves. If at least 2 KXS-es manage to keep the keys that they use for communicating with the Alice and with the Bob a secret and those same 2 KXS choose to keep the overheard temporary keys a secret, then absolutely no KXS is able to decrypt the Bob's and the Alice's onionencrypted session.




Optional Improvement Opportunities

In addition to the temporary keys that were overheard by the KXS, the Bob and the Alice may use additional temporary keys that they negotiated during previous sessions. During the session that is held through the eavesdropping KXS the Alice should generate halve of the temporary key and the Bob should generate the other halve.



Beneficial side Effects 

The more KXSs there are, the more break-ins have to be conducted to get all the keys that the Alice and the Bob use for communicating with the KXSs. If all of the sessions between the KXSs and their users are decrypted by eavesdroppers other than the KXSs themselves, then an increase of the number of KXSs increases the number of sessions that the non-KXS-eavesdroppers have to listen in, which in turn increases the number of different geographical locations, where the non-KXS-eavesdroppers need to place their probes. If the KXSs reside at different "jurisdictions" that happen to be enemies, for example, China, Russia, EU, United States, Latin America regions, Arabic dictatorships, etc. then the lack of intelligence sharing between those "jurisdictions" partly protects the Alice-Bob onionencrypted session from absolutely everybody, except the session related metadata, but the metadata can be "salted" by using temporary keys from previous onionencrypted sessions and by choosing the KXSs  randomly for every onionencrypted session.