Update of "Experiment: mmmv_symsig_t1"
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Artifact ID: 0b991420453c23a8d66fa3b17d471918a4c1a351
Page Name:Experiment: mmmv_symsig_t1
Date: 2017-10-08 20:37:42
Original User: martin_vahi
Parent: f5b613ca8f9ac382080530fe2d520ac72aa92694 (diff)
Next c1abe9e0c03ce6311df184942394e25ec323d279

The mmmv_symsig_t1 wraps symmetric key encryption command line tools and implements a signing system, where parties, who have never met directly for a key exchange can probabilistically authenticate each other. The feasibility of using one-time-pads or one-time-pad like ciphers is based on the fact that a year 2017 price for 1GiB of USB-stick based flash memory costs about 1€. With the exception of metadata related security issues, one-time-pad like ciphers tend to eliminate security flaws at the encryption algorithm side.

It's worth to note that if both keys of a public encryption algorithm are bundled together and the whole pair is kept secret the way  symmetric keys are kept secret, then public key encryption algorithms can be used as symmetric key encryption algorithms. That allows the "standard" tools like the GNU Privacy Guard to be used in the role of the symmetric key encryption algorithm implementation.


End users (hereafter: EnU), including the Bob and Alice, individually meet with a key exchange service provider (hereafter: KXS). The KXS gives each of them multiple GiB worth of symmetric keys that are shared only between the KXS and a single user of the KXS. If the users have not met