Currently the mmmv_symsig_t1 lacks any code.
The mmmv_symsig_t1 wraps symmetric key encryption command line tools
and implements a signing system, where parties, who have never met
directly for a key exchange can probabilistically authenticate each
other. The feasibility of using
like ciphers is based on the fact that a year 2017 price for 1GiB of
USB-stick based flash memory costs about 1€. With the exception of metadata
related security issues, one-time-pad like ciphers tend to eliminate
security flaws at the encryption algorithm side.
It's worth to note that if both keys of a public encryption algorithm are
bundled together and the whole pair is kept secret the way symmetric keys
are kept secret, then public key encryption algorithms can be used as symmetric
key encryption algorithms. That allows the "standard" tools like the
GNU Privacy Guard to be used in the role of
the symmetric key encryption algorithm implementation.
End users(hereafter: EnU
the Bob and the Alice
individually meet with a key exchange service provider (hereafter: KXS
The KXS gives each EnU multiple GiB worth of symmetric keys that are shared
only between the KXS and the EnU. If the EnUs have not met with each other for
a key exchange, then the
a central hub
that decrypts the ciphertext of one EnU and encrypts the
cleartext for another EnU. That is to say, if the Bob and the Alice use only a
single KXS, then the KXS acts like the Eve, when the Eve conducts a
. To probabilistically counter
the man-in-the-middle attack,
the Bob and the Alice use the services of multiple KXS to agree a set of
temporary encryption keys, one temporary key per one KXS. The Bob and the Alice
use the temporary keys for onion-encrypting the actual data exchange between
themselves. If at least 2 KXS-es manage to keep the keys that they use for
communicating with the Alice and with the Bob a secret and those same 2 KXS
choose to keep the overheard temporary keys a secret, then absolutely no KXS is
able to decrypt the Bob's and the Alice's onionencrypted session.
Optional Improvement Opportunities
In addition to the temporary keys that were overheard by the KXS, the Bob
and the Alice may use additional temporary keys that they negotiated during
previous sessions. During the session that is held through the eavesdropping
KXS the Alice should generate halve of the temporary key and the Bob should
generate the other halve.
Beneficial side Effects
The more KXSs there are, the more break-ins have to be conducted to get
all the keys that the Alice and the Bob use for communicating with the KXSs. If
all of the sessions between the KXSs and their users are decrypted by
eavesdroppers other than the KXSs themselves, then an increase of the number of
KXSs increases the number of sessions that the non-KXS-eavesdroppers have to
listen in, which in turn increases the number of different geographical
locations, where the non-KXS-eavesdroppers need to place their probes.