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Wiki page [Experiment: mmmv_silkexec] by martin_vahi on 2017-01-08 17:37:11.
D 2017-01-08T17:37:11.268
L Experiment:\smmmv_silkexec
P 48ba7662146665781b86389d8a2d8b6c343ff519
U martin_vahi
W 3651
<p><b><font color="#ff0000">Currently code for the mmmv_silkexec does not exist</font></b>,
but the development deliverables will be among versioned files, when it becomes


<p>A <b>mmmv_silkexec application is wrapper to other applications</b>,
including other mmmv_silkexec applications. <b>The purpose of the wrapping is
to use extra tags and user specific configuration parameters</b> for using the
wrappable application.</p>

<p>The mmmv_silkexec project consists of the following tools:</p>

<li>The mmmv_silkexec command line tool for executing mmmv_silkexec
applications by automatically prefixing the PATH with an mmmv_silkexec
application specific PATH value. Call syntax: &nbsp;</li>

<blockquote>mmmv_silkexec &lt;full path of or a name on the PATH&gt; &lt;the
command line args of the mmmv_silkexec application&gt;</blockquote>

<li>An application for maintaining the tags, for example, tester specific test
<li>An application for maintaining mmmv_silkexec local installation specific
global configuration and the collection of mmmv_silkexec applications.<br>


<p>No technical solution is going to compensate for crappy work, because
technical tools can be switched off or the original authors of software may
leave edge cases out of consideration. The main ideas behind the mmmv_silkexec
are<b>&nbsp;</b>to <b>allow the execution of only those mmmv_silkexec
applications that have been tested and/or verified by trusted parties</b>, the
<a href="">NixOS package manager</a> idea that each
application is executed in an environment, where <b>the LD_LIBRARY_PATH and the
PATH have mmmv_silkexec application specific prefixes</b>, the reliance on
operating system services is&nbsp;<b>limited to the UNIX standard</b> to give
the mmmv_silkexec a chance to be ported to all operating systems that have the
UNIX layer <i>(Linux, BSD, GNU Hurd, Genode OS, Minix3),</i> the&nbsp;mmmv_silkexec
must be fully <b>usable without having any root access</b>.</p>


<h1>Package Format</h1>



<h1>Testing (Including Verification and Audits)</h1>

<p>The executable mmmv_silkexec application must have only dependencies that
have also been verified and/or tested by trusted parties.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Different parties trust different other parties. Trust is a multidimensional
value. A very kindhearted and not corrupt person can be totally untrustworthy
from their capabilities point of view. On the other hand, sometimes, at some
narrow contexts, enemies can be more trustworthy than friends. For example,
enemies might have a good track record of fine skills and being rigorous and
they might use some component, software package, at some security wise
extremely critical role, while being very rigorous at the construction of their
software component.<br>

<p>Given that
<a href="">the
only proper way to verify/review code is a fully automated way</a><i>(<a href="">archival
copy</a>)</i>, there has to be a way to subscribe to the testing/verification
system of the trusted parties. To avoid a Denial of Service attack by hacking
into the testing/verification systems of one of the trusted parties, the local
settings of the mmmv_silkexec should treat a test failure of a formerly
accepted component as a timed warning, where the warning state moves to a
blocked/failed state with a delay. The delay gives the trusted party time to
handle the hack.</p>


Z 435febe05487e05a023ad246f681f2c3